This second entry is on the material conditions related to the development (or lack thereof) of the Greek general, or Strategos. Again, it is primarily a military piece. All dates are B.C. unless otherwise noted.
The Strategos
Despite the military dominance of their armies, the Classical Greeks developed very few great captains. Those that come quickly to mind are Brasidas (a brilliant Spartan commander during the latter half of the Peloponnesian War) ,Epaminondas (the Theban father of modern strategy who led his army to victory over the Spartans in 371), the innovative condottiero Iphicrates of Athens, Pyrrhus of Epirus, and Alexander. The Spartans, despite their ability to turn out excellent soldiers, produced but two commanders of note: Brasidas, and the controversial admiral Lysander, and both during the latter half of the 5th century, and, significantly both operated in conditions that were uncommon to the traditional heavy infantry base of Spartan operations. It was left to the Romans to produce strategic leadership in a consistent manner.
The classical phalanx has been romantically referred to as the "armed polis". This gives us some indication as to its origins, which lay with the development of the ctiy-states themselves. In the archaic period, the lack of a developed state structure, and so also lacking a military organization, meant that the early Greek commander was the tribal "front fighter". In order to instill any discipline at all, it was necessary that he lead by example and by feats of personal bravery. It is notable that the role of the general, or "strategos", did not completely change from the front-fighter, even through the 5th and 4th century. The strategos continued to fight in the front rank of the phalanx, on the right side place of honor, and there is a long list of generals killed in such action, including the above-mentioned Brasidas and Epaminondas. This practice persisted despite the growth in strategic and tactical use of combined arms in the latter half of the 5th century.
In Athens, the Board of Strategoi, a body born in the late 6th century, was a government council made up of the ten annually elected strategoi. It was heavily, if not exclusively, stacked with representatives from the same old aristocratic families. This will not shock anyone, as politics in general were very much the sphere of Athens' top families; the class nature of Athenian democracy shows itself in the fact that being an elected official was a full-time job with no pay, but not many farmers had enough slaves to completely leave their farm behind for the city through the whole year. But, it does illustrate the continuing connection between the aristocratic front fighter and the strategos. Being a politically important position, it was not necessarily the best military minds who were elected to this position, and the genius of the competent was often negated by the common practice of splitting commands between political opponents (see the tragic fate of the Syracuse expedition in 415).
Unlike in the East, war was not the exclusive sphere of a warrior caste. But, as I noted, the positions of command were nonetheless manned by the sons of aristocracy. This persisted despite the coming of democracy in Athens. The aristocracy of large land and slave owners, after all, was the only class in society that was trained in military arts until well into the 4th century. This situation was in contradiction with the make-up of the phalanx, as the citizen phalanx forced the aristocratic fighters to rely on the shields of the small farmer- hardly conditions in which to win personal glory.
It was also in contradiction with the conditions of battle. The phalanx relied on discipline and unit cohesion as much as skill in arms. Sword fighting came into play primarily during retreat or other moments of desperation. It would be a mistake to call it a useless skill, but it certainly did not carry the value that it did in the Homeric tribal battles of the past. There were those in Athens who mocked the many trainers who sold lessons on swordsmanship to the wealthy, but this was an important tradition to the sons of the slave owners. The phalanx did not rely on personal bravery and did not present its fighters with one-on-one combat with which to prove that bravery and skill. The training of the aristocracy was a holdover from the past and the classical strategos was a transitional position between the tribal front fighter and Roman general. It was events related to the ascendancy of slave society in the 5th century that would strain the contradictions of the position.
The classical phalanx has been romantically referred to as the "armed polis". This gives us some indication as to its origins, which lay with the development of the ctiy-states themselves. In the archaic period, the lack of a developed state structure, and so also lacking a military organization, meant that the early Greek commander was the tribal "front fighter". In order to instill any discipline at all, it was necessary that he lead by example and by feats of personal bravery. It is notable that the role of the general, or "strategos", did not completely change from the front-fighter, even through the 5th and 4th century. The strategos continued to fight in the front rank of the phalanx, on the right side place of honor, and there is a long list of generals killed in such action, including the above-mentioned Brasidas and Epaminondas. This practice persisted despite the growth in strategic and tactical use of combined arms in the latter half of the 5th century.
 |
| Strategoi |
In Athens, the Board of Strategoi, a body born in the late 6th century, was a government council made up of the ten annually elected strategoi. It was heavily, if not exclusively, stacked with representatives from the same old aristocratic families. This will not shock anyone, as politics in general were very much the sphere of Athens' top families; the class nature of Athenian democracy shows itself in the fact that being an elected official was a full-time job with no pay, but not many farmers had enough slaves to completely leave their farm behind for the city through the whole year. But, it does illustrate the continuing connection between the aristocratic front fighter and the strategos. Being a politically important position, it was not necessarily the best military minds who were elected to this position, and the genius of the competent was often negated by the common practice of splitting commands between political opponents (see the tragic fate of the Syracuse expedition in 415).
Unlike in the East, war was not the exclusive sphere of a warrior caste. But, as I noted, the positions of command were nonetheless manned by the sons of aristocracy. This persisted despite the coming of democracy in Athens. The aristocracy of large land and slave owners, after all, was the only class in society that was trained in military arts until well into the 4th century. This situation was in contradiction with the make-up of the phalanx, as the citizen phalanx forced the aristocratic fighters to rely on the shields of the small farmer- hardly conditions in which to win personal glory.
It was also in contradiction with the conditions of battle. The phalanx relied on discipline and unit cohesion as much as skill in arms. Sword fighting came into play primarily during retreat or other moments of desperation. It would be a mistake to call it a useless skill, but it certainly did not carry the value that it did in the Homeric tribal battles of the past. There were those in Athens who mocked the many trainers who sold lessons on swordsmanship to the wealthy, but this was an important tradition to the sons of the slave owners. The phalanx did not rely on personal bravery and did not present its fighters with one-on-one combat with which to prove that bravery and skill. The training of the aristocracy was a holdover from the past and the classical strategos was a transitional position between the tribal front fighter and Roman general. It was events related to the ascendancy of slave society in the 5th century that would strain the contradictions of the position.
Border skirmishes and world wars
There is an idea that battles between Greek armies were somehow formalized and bound by rules of conduct or traditions. In the 4th century, Athenian politicians spoke of how the "ancients" conducted war in a more honorable way, with rules and notions of fairness. In reality, these men spoke of the Greeks of the 5th century, just a few generations removed, and one can provide numerous examples of trickery, ambush, and barbarism both before and during the Peloponnesian War. This talk is reminiscent of the commonly-heard, and ridiculous, notion that wars in the 19th century were somehow formalized and honorable, etc. etc. The Greek wars during the 7th and 6th centuries were certainly limited in scope and aim, but that is a different issue.
Mainland Greece, as I have mentioned before, was not known for being a particularly wealthy land. This is especially true of the Greece of the 6th and 7th centuries, the period in which the phalanx developed. Corinth stood out as the first major trading city, its unique geography giving it excellent ports on both the East and West sides of the isthmus. Other than this one Greek city, the major trade cities were concentrated in the East- the Eastern Greek cities of Miletus and Sardis, Egyptian Memphis, and Tyre. But, it was not until after the Persian Wars that the city states began to grow wealthy and greatly expand their commercial interests. In a period when sea travel was dangerous due to piracy, foreign war ships, and the limitations of navigational technology, there was no such thing as separation of military and commercial enterprise; the two were intimately linked to each other, and so also the interest of the state. After the Persian defeats, Athens, with her newly-built navy went on the offensive throughout the Aegean and southern Mediterranean, clearing the way for Greek ascendance in rapid fashion.
Clauswitz famously wrote that war is a continuation of politics by other means. The aim in war is, generally, to destroy the ability of the enemy to continue the conflict. But, the political aims of the combatants give proportion to the means by which the war is fought and propagated. So, the more limited the aims- the less that the arouse great interest and concern the fate of the ruling class, and the state as a whole- the more likely it is that peace will be sought, and obtained, through avenues other than the annihilation of the military power of the enemy state. There is a point at which the cost of carrying on the conflict becomes greater than the political object itself.
Before the Persian Wars, the interests of conflict were generally of a limited nature. Border conflicts, inevitable given the lack of arable land and the agricultural interest of both the small farmers and large slave owners alike, made up the vast majority of warfare between the mainland states. The Greeks of the Classical Period had no general method of taxation for military expenses. Funds were secured on a needs basis through a combination of compulsory collection and individual donation and loan. It was not long before a campaign ate through the available funds.
Neither were there, among the Greeks, standing professional armies. Each state relied on citizen militias up until the late 4th century, although an increasing use of mercenaries was made from the middle 5th century on. The men who made up the phalanx, especially in the period before the Persian invasions, were the land and slave-owning farmers of each state. These citizens were willing to give a limited amount of time for campaigning before they had to return to their fields.
All of the above-mentioned factors conspired to assure that the short campaign, leading up to a pitched battle, dominated the warfare of the 7th and 6th centuries. There were no formal rules that govern this, merely material conditions. This point flies in the face of a long historical tradition. This school can see for themselves the limited nature of Greek campaigns during the archaic period before the 5th century, their tendency toward the pitched battle, and these men can also plainly contrast those practices with the rapid military changes during the 5th century; they come to the conclusion that warfare must have been more ritualized, but then things began to change. Unfortunately, they are only viewing the superficial aspects of the issue - warfare is rooted in the material interests of the ruling classes of a given society, be they unconscious or not.
Relating this all back to the Strategos: there was little demand for the development of the general as the strategic commander and planner during the early period of hoplite warfare. It is no accident that the first great Greek generals are born of the later 5th century and the Peloponnesian War; the stakes were higher and concerned access to the wealth of the greater Mediterranean world, rather than the shifting of tiny borders. This led to myriad changes in the military organization of Grecian armies and fleets, but overall, the situation led to the demand for true generalship. And when great men are demanded by historical conditions, they tend to appear.
Ultimately, the city states never produced an Alexander, Scipio, or Caesar- the strategos was a transitional position in the development of the Western general. But, to not understand the material conditions which governed the possibility of that development is to be forced to accept the poor notion of a formalized warfare. And to accept that is to fall into an idealist trap of either calling the Greeks not naturally inclined toward military genius or lacking a great mind to come up with better ideas in relation to military command- both of these are wrong.
Mainland Greece, as I have mentioned before, was not known for being a particularly wealthy land. This is especially true of the Greece of the 6th and 7th centuries, the period in which the phalanx developed. Corinth stood out as the first major trading city, its unique geography giving it excellent ports on both the East and West sides of the isthmus. Other than this one Greek city, the major trade cities were concentrated in the East- the Eastern Greek cities of Miletus and Sardis, Egyptian Memphis, and Tyre. But, it was not until after the Persian Wars that the city states began to grow wealthy and greatly expand their commercial interests. In a period when sea travel was dangerous due to piracy, foreign war ships, and the limitations of navigational technology, there was no such thing as separation of military and commercial enterprise; the two were intimately linked to each other, and so also the interest of the state. After the Persian defeats, Athens, with her newly-built navy went on the offensive throughout the Aegean and southern Mediterranean, clearing the way for Greek ascendance in rapid fashion.
Clauswitz famously wrote that war is a continuation of politics by other means. The aim in war is, generally, to destroy the ability of the enemy to continue the conflict. But, the political aims of the combatants give proportion to the means by which the war is fought and propagated. So, the more limited the aims- the less that the arouse great interest and concern the fate of the ruling class, and the state as a whole- the more likely it is that peace will be sought, and obtained, through avenues other than the annihilation of the military power of the enemy state. There is a point at which the cost of carrying on the conflict becomes greater than the political object itself.
Before the Persian Wars, the interests of conflict were generally of a limited nature. Border conflicts, inevitable given the lack of arable land and the agricultural interest of both the small farmers and large slave owners alike, made up the vast majority of warfare between the mainland states. The Greeks of the Classical Period had no general method of taxation for military expenses. Funds were secured on a needs basis through a combination of compulsory collection and individual donation and loan. It was not long before a campaign ate through the available funds.
Neither were there, among the Greeks, standing professional armies. Each state relied on citizen militias up until the late 4th century, although an increasing use of mercenaries was made from the middle 5th century on. The men who made up the phalanx, especially in the period before the Persian invasions, were the land and slave-owning farmers of each state. These citizens were willing to give a limited amount of time for campaigning before they had to return to their fields.
All of the above-mentioned factors conspired to assure that the short campaign, leading up to a pitched battle, dominated the warfare of the 7th and 6th centuries. There were no formal rules that govern this, merely material conditions. This point flies in the face of a long historical tradition. This school can see for themselves the limited nature of Greek campaigns during the archaic period before the 5th century, their tendency toward the pitched battle, and these men can also plainly contrast those practices with the rapid military changes during the 5th century; they come to the conclusion that warfare must have been more ritualized, but then things began to change. Unfortunately, they are only viewing the superficial aspects of the issue - warfare is rooted in the material interests of the ruling classes of a given society, be they unconscious or not.
Relating this all back to the Strategos: there was little demand for the development of the general as the strategic commander and planner during the early period of hoplite warfare. It is no accident that the first great Greek generals are born of the later 5th century and the Peloponnesian War; the stakes were higher and concerned access to the wealth of the greater Mediterranean world, rather than the shifting of tiny borders. This led to myriad changes in the military organization of Grecian armies and fleets, but overall, the situation led to the demand for true generalship. And when great men are demanded by historical conditions, they tend to appear.
Ultimately, the city states never produced an Alexander, Scipio, or Caesar- the strategos was a transitional position in the development of the Western general. But, to not understand the material conditions which governed the possibility of that development is to be forced to accept the poor notion of a formalized warfare. And to accept that is to fall into an idealist trap of either calling the Greeks not naturally inclined toward military genius or lacking a great mind to come up with better ideas in relation to military command- both of these are wrong.
No comments:
Post a Comment