This post will be the first in a group of military and historical writings that do not necessarily fit within the scope of "Class Struggle and Classical Greece", but are nonetheless of interest. None of these are meant to be scholarly works or to exhaust any of the issues. All dates are understood to be B.C. unless otherwise noted.
The Big Push
Everyone who knows something about ancient Greek warfare is probably familiar with the image of the phalanx, a shield wall bristling with spears, as stout in defense as it was irresistible in offense. Others may have seen the movie "300" in which the Spartan hoplites (heavily-armed spearmen) demonstrated their method of crashing into the enemy line shield-first, and then using the push to make headway. Despite the lack of historical value of that silly film, its depiction of the phalanx in combat is, more or less, representative of the mainstream view of classical historians. This view sees the mass of hoplites advancing at a run with the aim of colliding, shield-first, into the enemy and then the rear ranks pushing with on the backs of their comrades with their shields until one side breaks. However, the issue of the battle-ending "big push"has been the center of controversy for some time. What is in question is not IF the Greek phalanx was the most advanced form of infantry unit of its time - this has been settled by the record of Greek military success- it is WHY.
No one alive has ever fought in a phalanx, or any similar military formation. Everything we know, we owe to the ancient Greek and Roman historians. The ancient historians, though, are a notoriously difficult and unreliable bunch. Despite all the wonderful insight and detail that Thucydides and Xenophon- those two who we owe most for our knowledge of classical warfare - provide us with, they tell us very little about the specifics of what went on during the drawing up of the lines, what happened when the march forward began, how signals were given, or, crucially, what happened when those lines of men met. In the days before history had formed into a discipline, it was not deemed necessary to write about things that were mundane or familiar; the ancient historians, despite their intellect and talent, could not conceive how anyone would find such details of any interest. Rather, the unusual, special, and exciting were the subject of their chronicles. In a society with no standing army, all male citizens would have been familiar with the methods of war, either from first-hand experience, from the training ground, or just the stories of their fathers. It would not be until the reigns of Philip and Alexander that the idea of a professional Greek army would be put into practice.
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| Marathon |
A legacy of this vague treatment of battle conditions is the conception of the push. Herodotus told us of the heroic Athenian resistance at Marathon (490), the first battle in which a Greek army overthrew the multitudes of the Persian levies. The Athenian phalanx lined up facing the beach head held by the Persians, and upon Miltiades signal, began their advance, at a run, across the 1,500 meters between the armies, before meeting the Persian lines. It is universally recognized that the Athenians did not really run for nearly a mile in hoplite equipment; the heavy shield, cuirass, helmet, and greaves would have made sure of that. It is more likely that they ran the last 200-300 meters of the advance, still no small achievement for an amateur army. Herodotus leaves us with the idea that the Athenians smashed into the Persian lines head-on, presumably with their shields, bowling the lighter-armed Easterners over with their impetuous.
There are other records of hoplites advancing at a run, but we should not assume that the purpose was to speed towards an impact. Well-known classical historian Victor Davis Hanson, representing the orthodox view, writes that the hoplites collided at each other at ten miles per hour and then pushed into the back of the men in front of them with their shields. I will address the pushing below, but as to the pushing, there is another factor on the battlefield that is deadly to soldiers besides other infantry- missile troops. Few things kill the morale of a body of troops faster than being subjected to prolonged missile fire- take the French at Agincourt for a classic example- and the men in the phalanx were no different in this regard. The effective range of a bow was around 200 yards. The Athenians at Marathon were not fools; choosing to run would reduce the time spent under the withering fire of Persian bows. This seems to explain running toward the enemy, generally.
As for the pushing into the backs of men in front of each line, this also seems suspect. Such a tight push would make it impossible, for instance, to retrieve the wounded, or for one to ever get back up once they had been knocked down. Furthermore, it would make those in the front rank little more than the tip of a battering ram; no real skill at arms would be required or valued if all they had to do was continue to push forward and stab at whatever appeared before them.
Paul van Wees makes the point that Xenophon notes a man falling and rising three times during a battle in Hellenica, hardly something that would be possible in a rigorous pushing match. The Spartan king Cleombrotus, who fell during the fighting at Leuctra (371), was carried to the back of the line by his men. If he had been at the front of a giant squeeze, his body would be trampled underfoot without the Thebans being kind enough to stop their own push in order that the king of their enemy be taken away; this was hardly in their character. Of course, there is also no need to be one-sided and suggest that pushing never happened. It is possible that those in the front line may have utilized a shield push to allow for the second line to strike at their now-pinned and off-balance targets. This is a qualitatively different push than that suggested by Hanson and his fellows, though.
The phalanx has been called the ultimate shock formation. By this, it is understood that the "shock" is a physical one, of bodies of men shoving with their literal weight. I do not buy the idea of shock in this sense. Ardant Du Picq, a military historian of the 19th century, and veteran of the Crimean War, did not buy the idea of "shock" either. To him, based on documentary evidence collected from soldier interviews and from his own experience, men run because of mental more than physical force. Xenophon, the sharpest military mind we know of from this period, believed that a phalanx as shallow as two ranks could hold against a formation a hundred deep, if the discipline were good (see Cyropaedia). This is an exaggeration, but he is clearly not counting on shields in the back to provide force. The depth of a phalanx must have provided a shock to the morale of the enemy, such as the sight of the 50-deep left wing of the Thebans at Luectra- it would seem that no matter how many the Spartans killed, their spots would be filled, and the Thebans would feel the moral force of those fifty ranks behind them as well.
The phalanx has been called the ultimate shock formation. By this, it is understood that the "shock" is a physical one, of bodies of men shoving with their literal weight. I do not buy the idea of shock in this sense. Ardant Du Picq, a military historian of the 19th century, and veteran of the Crimean War, did not buy the idea of "shock" either. To him, based on documentary evidence collected from soldier interviews and from his own experience, men run because of mental more than physical force. Xenophon, the sharpest military mind we know of from this period, believed that a phalanx as shallow as two ranks could hold against a formation a hundred deep, if the discipline were good (see Cyropaedia). This is an exaggeration, but he is clearly not counting on shields in the back to provide force. The depth of a phalanx must have provided a shock to the morale of the enemy, such as the sight of the 50-deep left wing of the Thebans at Luectra- it would seem that no matter how many the Spartans killed, their spots would be filled, and the Thebans would feel the moral force of those fifty ranks behind them as well.
When the evidence is poor and contradictory, as ours is, the historian must draw upon knowledge of other similar modes of battle and human behavior. Of course, there is always a threat of anachronism and over-generalization when treating this ground, but I feel confident in making some limited comparisons. To say that the Greeks fought in such a way as suggested by the orthodox view is to say that they invented a historically unique mode of combat. We know that similar material and social conditions create similar results and conclusions. Was Greece so insular and unique as to produce a totally alien military? Hardly.
The Greeks, being a people forced to face the sea by their very geography, have been in contact with the rest of the Mediterranean world for centuries before the classical phalanx really evolved into what we are familiar with. There are aspects of Near Eastern warfare evident in earlier Greek warfare, such as the chariot, which certainly was not a home grown invention of the mountainous Greek mainland. Without going into too much detail, we can throw out the notion that there was some special effect as to create a totally alien form of combat in world history.
The medieval armies bested by the Swiss pikes were, in a purely military sense, similar to those Persian forces faced by the Greeks in the 5th century. The men-at-arms (feudal nobility fighting on foot) that made up the core of the medieval infantry force were similar to the military caste that traditionally made up the core of Eastern armies in the ancient world. Individually they were brave and skilled warriors, but they fought, more or less, as individuals who happened to be in a unit. The strength in both the armies of Persia and European Feudalism rested in their cavalry, though, and it was precisely this arm that was most easily broken by the abilities of the spearman. The Swiss pikes, and the Greek phalanx, fought as a unit that happened to be made up of individuals.
Another similarity to be drawn between the Eastern force and the medieval is the primacy of cavalry in the attack. The cavalry charge is not successful because of some sort of literal shock where horsed trample over men; horses will not run into a stationary object. If a charge is successful, it is because the men broke the ranks and ran, allowing for the horsemen to ride them down at will. If the core of the Eastern force was made up of heavily-armed men of the military caste, the mass was of lightly-armed conscripts of varying degrees of reliability and training. These masses were prone to panic and not armed or trained to stand up to a charge of their social superiors. The situation was similar in the feudal force. The horsemen found it difficult, however, to find a way to approach the serried spears of the Swiss squares. The pike Square eventually became the dominant feature of all European armies into the 18th century AD.
It is a mistake to take a one-sided view of the development of the phalanx; much of the speculation on whether or not the "charge and push" method dominated is also linked to the question of whether or not battle was ritualized or not. The question will be dealt with in another post, but it is enough to say that there is no narrative model for a "typical" Greek battle in our sources. Furthermore, to assume that an historically unique mode of combat is responsible for the military victories of the Greeks is to lessen the real historical greatness of Greek civilization: they were the bearers of a higher form of production and upon that, a historically ascendant military model raised itself along with their other achievements. In short, if the historian abstracts the military from the social, then he is forced into all kinds of strange formulations.
Swiss Pikes and Hoplites
The phalanx was a qualitatively higher form of infantry than had been in use in other armies, though. We can perhaps look to another historical example to better understand its effectiveness: the pike squares of the 15th century AD Swiss Confederacy. Similar situations create similar conclusions. The men in the pike square were without shield and, in actuality, more similar to the later Macedonian phalanx, but that can be ignored for the general point. In both the Macedonian phalanx and the pike square, the lack of an arm freed up for the offensive use of a shield limits the comparison to the hoplite phalanx, but it is still the most exact that history provides us with.The medieval armies bested by the Swiss pikes were, in a purely military sense, similar to those Persian forces faced by the Greeks in the 5th century. The men-at-arms (feudal nobility fighting on foot) that made up the core of the medieval infantry force were similar to the military caste that traditionally made up the core of Eastern armies in the ancient world. Individually they were brave and skilled warriors, but they fought, more or less, as individuals who happened to be in a unit. The strength in both the armies of Persia and European Feudalism rested in their cavalry, though, and it was precisely this arm that was most easily broken by the abilities of the spearman. The Swiss pikes, and the Greek phalanx, fought as a unit that happened to be made up of individuals.
Another similarity to be drawn between the Eastern force and the medieval is the primacy of cavalry in the attack. The cavalry charge is not successful because of some sort of literal shock where horsed trample over men; horses will not run into a stationary object. If a charge is successful, it is because the men broke the ranks and ran, allowing for the horsemen to ride them down at will. If the core of the Eastern force was made up of heavily-armed men of the military caste, the mass was of lightly-armed conscripts of varying degrees of reliability and training. These masses were prone to panic and not armed or trained to stand up to a charge of their social superiors. The situation was similar in the feudal force. The horsemen found it difficult, however, to find a way to approach the serried spears of the Swiss squares. The pike Square eventually became the dominant feature of all European armies into the 18th century AD.
Some Conclusions
Is it so difficult to imagine a similar situation in the early 5th century? The landscape of Greece did not lend itself to raising horses, so while the aristocrats of the city states certainly kept horses, it never became the jewel of the battlefield as in the East. Basing itself on a slave economy, Greece was able to free up its citizens (to varying degrees) from the daily toils of menial labor, not just its upper castes, as in Asiatic despotism; this had an effect on not only its culture, but its mode of war. The "citizen", rather than the "subject" also gives us an idea of the class balance of power that raised itself precariously on slave production. The citizen, freed to develop himself physically through athletics and varying amounts of basic military training, while defending the state that he had a stake in, made for a fearsome soldier and a more fearsome mode of fighting- fighting as a unit.It is a mistake to take a one-sided view of the development of the phalanx; much of the speculation on whether or not the "charge and push" method dominated is also linked to the question of whether or not battle was ritualized or not. The question will be dealt with in another post, but it is enough to say that there is no narrative model for a "typical" Greek battle in our sources. Furthermore, to assume that an historically unique mode of combat is responsible for the military victories of the Greeks is to lessen the real historical greatness of Greek civilization: they were the bearers of a higher form of production and upon that, a historically ascendant military model raised itself along with their other achievements. In short, if the historian abstracts the military from the social, then he is forced into all kinds of strange formulations.
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